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Abstract
This paper considers moral hazard in insurance markets when voluntary
monitoring technologies are available and insureds may choose the precision of
monitoring. Also privacy costs incurred thereby are taken into account. Two
alternative contract schemes are compared in terms of welfare: (i) monitoring
conditional on the loss with only the insurance indemnities based on the moni-
toring data, and (ii) unrestricted monitoring with both the premiums and the
indemnities depending on the data. With any contract scheme some monitor-
ing will be optimal unless the privacy costs increase too fast in relation to the
precision of the monitoring signal. In the benchmark situation (without pri-
vacy costs) relying completely on both signals (monitoring and the outcome)
informative of effort (ii) maximizes welfare. In the presence of privacy costs,
the contract with conditional monitoring (i) might dominate the contract which
fully includes the outcome and the monitoring signal into the sharing rule (ii).
Apart from the direct effect of restricting privacy costs only to the state of loss,
there are also an additional indirect incentive and a risk-sharing effect with
this contract. Letting the individuals choose the precision of the monitoring
technology at the time they reveal the data (ex post) is inefficient with either
contract scheme.
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1 Introduction
As monitoring technologies have become cheaper in the last years, an increasing num-
ber of automobile insurance companies have started offering innovative contracts,
which monitor the driving behavior of the insureds. The data are used to better
calculate individual risk and to adjust to it the contract of a particular insured.
Since 2004 the US insurer Progressive has been offering its ”TripSense” contract,
by which a monitoring device in the car records mileage, speed, acceleration and
braking. At the end of a billing period, the insured can review the collected data,
compare with other customers of the insurer and decide whether to upload the data
to the company. Depending on the records, the insurer promises reductions of the
insurance premiums for the next period. Britain’s largest insurer, Norwich Union,
introduced a similar contract, aimed at young drivers, which put more weight on
which time of the day the car is used. In the meanwhile the company has extended
its offer to general customers with its ”pay-as-you-drive” scheme that monitors the
type of road among other things. In contrast to Progressive’s contract scheme, the
data are transferred by GPS regularly within a billing period to the insurer, so that
insureds can observe the continuously updated insurance premium. Other insurers
testing similar products with their customers are Siwss Re, Zu¨rich Schweiz, WGV.
The Swiss insurer Winterthur is considering launching a project with a black box,
which stores among other things data about the longitudinal and cross acceleration
of the vehicle, and which would be opened only in the case of an accident. Future
technologies will not only allow for the collection of an increasing variety of data
concerning the driver’s own behavior, but also combine them with data related to
the traffic situations and to the immediate environment of the driver at any partic-
ular point in time.1
Generally, monitoring helps reduce information asymmetries and thus raises the ef-
ficiency of the contracts. However, a potential drawback of monitoring is the loss of
privacy. Moreover, future monitoring technologies will also support entertainment
and maintenance services, which will require even more data connectivity. Such
otherwise attractive services might be perceived by the consumers as an increased
threat to their privacy. This explains why some insurers are concerned that moni-
toring would not be accepted by their customers.
This paper analyzes the effects of monitoring on the contracts and also on welfare
when insurance markets are characterized by moral hazard2 and privacy costs are
taken into account. Loss prevention being the subject of the analysis, a model with
a fixed loss is used. This assumption takes into account that, when it comes to ex
ante moral hazard, the drivers’ care mainly influences the number of claims and,
to a much smaller extent, the value of a damage3. Although the number of insur-
ers who have already started or are considering the launch of monitoring contracts
1Even currently the monitoring technology of the German insurer WGV allows for comparing
the driver’s actual speed with the speed limits for the particular streets.
2A previous paper analyzed, in a similar setting, the problem of adverse selection (see
http://www.bgpe.de/, DP No.5).
3Lemaire (1998) argues that, in practice, the cost of an accident is regarded as being beyond the
control of a policyholder.
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is continuously increasing, such contracts are still a relatively new phenomenon.
The dynamics of this market and the wide variety in particular terms of existing
contracts, may indicate that, by trial and error, insurers are still searching for the
optimal contract. Because the monitoring contracts which are already offered by the
insurance companies differ in their specific design, and bearing in mind that even
more contract variations are conceivable, several different scenarios are analyzed and
compared with respect to the resulting welfare.
Depending on the specific technology used for collecting, correlating and analyzing
the data, the precision of data and its informativeness of true risk may vary. In
the existing real world applications, the accuracy and the range of collected data
are restricted by the particular monitoring technology of the insurer and insureds
are only free to decide whether or not to reveal the data. However, as monitoring
technologies evolve and become more sophisticated, in the future it might be possi-
ble to let the insureds decide how much and how precise should be the information
they wish to reveal. In view of the potential occurrence of privacy costs, it therefore
seems reasonable to consider such contracts that allow the insureds to determine the
precision of monitoring.
Specifically, two alternative contract schemes are analyzed. In the first one, moni-
toring takes place conditional on the loss and only the indemnities, which are paid
in case of an accident to the insured, are based on the information collected by a
black box. In contrast, the second contract scheme fully relies both on monitoring
and on the outcome in that it provides monitoring in either state of nature, and
both the premiums and the indemnities can depend on the monitoring data. Within
a contract scheme, the following scenarios are analyzed: (a) the precision of infor-
mation is exogenous and there are no privacy costs (benchmark situation); (b) in
the presence of privacy costs the precision of information is agreed upon ex ante,
i.e., when the contract is signed; and (c) insureds decide ex post, i.e., at the time
they reveal the information, how precise it should be.
It turns out that, in any contract scheme or scenario, some monitoring will be
optimal unless privacy costs increase too fast in relation to the precision of the
monitoring signal. If there are no privacy costs (benchmark situation), the second
contract scheme with unrestricted monitoring is welfare enhancing. This is because
it applies the principle, which was derived by Holmstro¨m (1979), Shavell (1979a)
and Harris and Raviv (1979), that the contract should depend on any signal which
is informative of effort.4
The main result of this paper is that, with privacy costs, the contract scheme with
4It can be shown that, even though this contract scheme approaches full damage insurance
when the precision of monitoring becomes arbitrarily close to perfect, the outcome-dependency
of the payments should not be suppressed. That is, in practice monitoring should not replace
partial insurance however close to perfect the technology is. This follows from a comparison of
this contract scheme with exogenously prescribed full damage insurance, where only the insurance
premiums depend on the monitoring signal. It turns out that (the analysis can be provided upon
request from the author), as the level of precision grows, the deficiency in terms of welfare of the
latter contract scheme as compared to the former one will grow, even though the former contract
approaches full damage insurance. The reason for this result is that using both the outcome and
the monitoring signal allows for more efficient penalties for deviating from high effort.
3
conditional monitoring may outperform the contract which fully relies on both sig-
nals. This result is attained not only because privacy costs are in expectation smaller
(direct effect), but also because privacy costs produce an additional incentive effect
on effort and also a positive risk-sharing effect (indirect effects). This applies all the
more, the higher is the efficiency of effort, the faster privacy costs grow in precision
and the less efficient is the monitoring technology.
Another result is that, for any contract scheme, determining ex post the level of
precision introduces an additional information asymmetry into the contractual rela-
tionship. It generates an undesired additional risk from the viewpoint of the insured
and thus it decreases welfare. Therefore such contracts with ex post flexibility of
monitoring precision, or more generally with ex post flexibility concerning the deci-
sion whether or not to reveal information, cannot be expected to persist in the long
run.
Although automobile insurance markets are used as a primary example in this paper,
the results may be applied equally well to other types of insurance. Health insurers
or life insurers, for instance, also provide different schemes to monitor the behav-
ior of their customers. Even some public health insurers offer rebates, or higher
coverage, if the insureds prove to have attended regular medical examinations5 or
various nutrition and fitness training courses. Private health insurers put even more
effort in detecting the health behavior of their customers (e.g. smoking, or the en-
gagement in risky sports). Still, the amount of information which health insurers
actually retrieve about their customers’ health behavior is probably far below what
is technically feasible through more detailed medical reports or the assignment of
additional medical tests. Undoubtedly, privacy is a sensitive issue in health insur-
ance, and probably individuals are more concerned about the privacy of their health
behavior rather than that of their driving behavior. Differing privacy costs for dif-
ferent spheres of activity may help to explain why different levels of monitoring in
different insurance markets are applied even if monitoring may be equally feasible
in all of them. Moreover, with conditional monitoring, inferring the efficiency of
the contracts, which are offered in different insurance markets, by simply comparing
their observable features might be misleading. If a contract provides more insurance
coverage, and therefore better risk sharing than another, it need not imply that the
efficiency of the monitoring technology, and therefore the welfare of the consumers
in this market, is higher. Better risk sharing in a market may as well be the result
of a lower efficiency of monitoring, however, combined with a greater concern about
privacy in this sphere of activity. This paper demonstrates that the overall welfare
of individuals in this market will be lower than in a market with lower privacy costs,
although the contracts seemingly suggest the opposite.
There is a comprehensive literature on the role of imperfect monitoring in the pres-
ence of moral hazard. The seminal papers by Holmstro¨m (1979), Shavell (1979a),
and Harris / Raviv (1979), which were mentioned above, analyze the value of ad-
ditional information (besides the outcome) when it is costless and exogenous for
5In dental health insurance, for instance, the coverage of certain costs depends on the regularity
of previous dental examinations.
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the contractual relationship. They find that, no matter how noisy the additional
signal is, its value is always positive as long as it is informative of effort and the
agent is risk averse. Milgrom (1981) establishes the relationship between first-order
stochastic dominance as a criterion for the favorableness of signals for the contrac-
tual relationship and the marginal likelihood ratio property. He finds that signals
with this property result in an increasing contract sharing rule. Gjesdal (1982) and
Grossman / Hart (1983) also perform a comparison of different information systems,
however, applying Blackwell’s criterion (see also Laffont (1989), 62-66). Kim (1995)
introduces the mean preserving spread criterion for ranking information systems,
which can be applied more broadly than Homstro¨m’s informativeness criterion or
Blackwell’s criterion.
For the special case of insurance markets, Shavell (1979b) considers two forms of
monitoring - ex ante and ex post. He finds that, if monitoring is imperfect, ex
ante observations, where both the insurance premium and indemnity depend on the
information, are more valuable than ex post observations, which take place condi-
tional on the loss, and with which only the indemnity depends on the observation.
This result is derived also in this paper by the comparison of the first and second
contract schemes for the scenario of no privacy costs. Also Shavell’s finding that, for
the same quality of observation and if the costs of ex ante monitoring are sufficiently
low, ex ante observation will be preferred no matter how low is the cost of ex post
observation, is confirmed in this paper. The focus of this paper, however, is to find
out under what conditions which contract scheme will be efficient when the quality
of monitoring, and hence also the costs of monitoring, are endogenous.
A number of articles on endogenous monitoring deal with random sampling (see e.g.
Townsend (1979), Lambert (1985), Dye (1986)), which, however, is not the subject
of this paper. Singh (1985) considers monitoring with endogenous precision of the
signal, the model for which resembles the one in this paper. However, his focus lies
mainly on the marginal value of information at the point of zero information and
the results are applied in a context rather different from this paper. Meth (1996)
also studies a principal-agent model in which the agent can affect the precision of
additional information. In contrast to this paper, in which the outcome distribution
is independent of precision, in his model precision is understood as a reduction of the
outcome variance, such that it improves the principal’s ability to infer the agent’s
effort from the outcome. Meth finds that, if the reduction of the outcome variance is
unobservable, an additional problem of moral hazard emerges. An analogous result
is obtained in this paper for the case that the level of precision is determined ex
post.
As in this paper, Demougin / Fluet (2001) consider a binary signal on effort, the
precision of which may endogenously vary. The focus of their paper is to character-
ize the optimal incentive and monitoring mix in a principal-agent relationship where
both parties are risk-neutral and agents face a limited-liability constraint. This pa-
per, in contrast, considers risk-averse agents. It is closely related to Kim / Suh
(1992) as it models the monitoring technology in a similar fashion - the distribution
of a binary signal depends both on the exerted effort and on the comprehensive-
ness of the monitoring data. In their article Kim / Suh study a principal-agent
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relationship, in which the principal can choose the precision of the monitoring tech-
nology, which incurs constant marginal costs. Specifically, the principal chooses the
level of the monitoring investment after he observes the outcome, which in fact per-
mits conditional monitoring. The main result of their article is that, for a concave
monitoring technology, the level of precision decreases in the observed outcome. In
contrast, this paper considers a situation, in which the agents (i.e. the insureds)
are those who may choose the amount of monitoring data they supply and, thus,
the level of precision. This is the reason why an additional information asymmetry
enters the contract when precision is determined ex post. The special case of mon-
itoring taking place conditional on the loss is included by explicitly setting up the
respective framework. Although letting the precision of monitoring be dependent on
the outcome (which would make sense only for the second contract scheme) is not
considered explicitly, it can be verified that allowing for it would result in a larger
level of precision being optimal for the loss state, which corresponds to Kim / Suh’s
result. In their article, Kim / Suh (1992) use a square root function to illustrate
the incentive and risk-sharing effects of precision. In this paper, the same function
is applied but rather for the purpose of comparing the differing contract schemes in
terms of welfare.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section outlines the main setting of the
model, section 3. considers the first contract scheme with monitoring conditional on
the loss and basing only the indemnities on the monitoring signal. Within this con-
tract scheme, a benchmark situation with exogenous precision and no privacy costs
(3.1), in the presence of privacy costs, endogenous precision ex ante (3.2), and en-
dogenous precision ex post (3.3) are addressed. The second contract scheme (section
4) envisages monitoring in both states of nature and allows for both the premiums
and indemnities to depend on the monitoring signal. Both the outcome and the
monitoring signal are fully involved into the sharing rule. Section 5 compares the
results in terms of welfare, section 6 discusses the results and concludes.
2 The model
It is assumed that individuals have an initial wealth ofW and there are two possible
outcomes: loss (L < W ) and no loss, and two possible levels of effort (eH > eL)
with corresponding probabilities of no loss pH > pL. Insurers, who compete per-
fectly, offer contracts with premium r and indemnity d. Depending on the precision
of the collected information i ∈ [0, 1] and on the effort chosen by the individual,
a binary signal sj , j ∈ {H,L} is generated by the monitoring technology, where
P (sH |eH , i) is the probability of observing the good signal if effort was high and given
that the precision of information is i, where ∂P (s
H |eH ,i)
∂i > 0,
∂2P (sH |eH ,i)
∂i2
< 0, ∀ i,
P (sL|eH , i) = 1− P (sH |eH , i), and for simplicity P (sH |eH , i) = P (sL|eL, i) = P (i).
If no information is revealed, the signal is not informative of effort and P (0) = 12 .
Further it holds that ∂P (i)∂i |i=1 = 0, i.e. when all the feasible precision is applied
(all collected data are submitted), no further increase of the probability of observing
the good signal is possible, but it need not mean perfect information, P (1) < 1.
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Individuals’ utility function is given by U(w, e, i) = u(w)−v(e)−g(i), where u(w) is
the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of net wealth, v(e) is the disutility of
effort,and g(i) is the loss of privacy, which is increasing and convex in the precision
of information, i.e. u′(w) > 0, u′′(w) < 0, v(eH) > v(eL), g′(i) > 0, g′′(i) > 0. In
addition, the marginal privacy loss from increasing precision when precision is zero
is also zero, g′(0) = 0.
3 Conditional monitoring
The terms of this contract scheme provide that monitoring as a signal of exerted
effort is restricted only to the loss state. As is depicted in Fig.1, the insured pays the
premium immediately after accepting the contract, so that it cannot be based on the
collected data. After accepting the contract, the insured decides which effort level
to choose. If a loss occurs, the insured decides whether, and how precise information
to reveal to the insurer. Based on this information, a signal is generated and the
insurer pays an indemnity depending on that signal.
lossLoss/Noer lossifi
LL
HH
sd
sd
if
if
Figure 1: time structure - basing indemnities on the signal
3.1 Benchmark situation
Due to perfect competition, in equilibrium those contracts will result by which the
individuals attain the highest expected utility. In case that individuals prefer to
implement eL, no incentives and no monitoring are necessary.
In case that individuals wish to implement the high effort level eH , the optimal
contract is found by
max
r,dH ,dL
pHu(wN ) + (1− pH)[P (i)u(wH) + (1− P (i))u(wL)]− v(eH) (1)
s.t.
pHu(wN ) + (1− pH)[P (i)u(wH) + (1− P (i))u(wL)]− v(eH) ≥
pLu(wN ) + (1− pL)[(1− P (i))u(wH) + P (i)u(wL)]− v(eL)
r − (1− pH)[P (i)dH + (1− P (i))dL] ≥ 0
where wL =W −L−r+dL, wH =W −L−r+dH , wN =W −r are the net wealths
in the respective states of nature. Let λ1 and λ2 be the Lagrange multipliers for the
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incentive constraint and zero-profit constraint respectively, which are both positive
(see A1 in the appendix). From the first order conditions one gets for an interior
solution the following expressions6:
1
u′(wH)
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1− 1− p
L
1− pH
1− P (i)
P (i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΨH
) (2)
1
u′(wL)
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1− 1− p
L
1− pH
P (i)
1− P (i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΨL
) (3)
1
u′(wN )
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1− p
L
pH︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΨN
) (4)
For i = 0 the standard non-monitoring solution results, where dH = dL < L. For
i > 0, a comparison of (2),(3) and (4) shows that, if p
H(1−pL)
pL(1−pH) <
P (i)
1−P (i) , the ordering
of net wealth will be wH > wN > wL. This implies that dL < L < dH : when
the efficiency of effort, i.e. the difference between pH and pL, is small, or when the
precision of information is high (P (i) is large), the indemnity in case of the good
signal will be larger than the loss. In the opposite case that p
H(1−pL)
pL(1−pH) >
P (i)
1−P (i) , i.e.
if effort is more efficient or the precision of information is lower, there will be partial
insurance irrespective of the signal, dL < dH < L. The ordering of net wealth will
then be wN > wH > wL. The reason for this result is quite straightforward. In the
first case, the state of nature is not as informative of effort as the monitoring signal
compared to the second case. Hence, from the viewpoint of the insurer facing a loss
and a good signal in the first case, it is more likely that high effort was exerted than
when there is a loss and a good signal in the second case. Therefore in the first case
the good signal leads to a reward of dH > L and in the second case the loss leads to
a penalty of dH < L.
Especially for a comparison of the different contract schemes and in order to illustrate
the effects of increasing precision, it turns out to be helpful to apply a particular
utility function. In a different context Kim / Suh (1992) apply u(w) = 2
√
w in
order to illustrate the incentive and risk sharing effects of precision. Similarly to
their procedure in Theorem 3 of their paper it can be shown that for u(w) = 2
√
w:
a) V ar(Ψ) increases in i (the monitoring signal becomes more informative of effort
as precision increases),
b) λ1 is decreases in i (incentives on effort improve),
c) V ar( 1u′(w)) decreases in i (risk sharing improves),
d) λ2 decreases in i (expected utility / efficiency increase in i).
6It is assumed that wL > a, a > 0, to ensure the existence of an interior solution.
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Proof:
a)
V ar(Ψ)|i>0 = (p
L)2
pH
+
(1− pL)2
1− pH
(
[1− P (i)]2
P (i)
+
[P (i)]2
1− P (i)
)
− 1 (5)
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
|i>0 = ∂V ar(Ψ)
∂P (i)
∂P (i)
∂i
=
(2P − 1)
(P − 1)2P 2
(1− pL)2
1− pH
∂P (i)
∂i
> 0 (6)
Without monitoring (i = 0), because of
(
[1−P (0)]2
P (0) +
[P (0)]2
1−P (0)
)
= 1,
V ar(Ψ)|i=0 = (p
L)2 − pH
pH
+
(1− pL)2
1− pH =
[pH − pL]2
pH(1− pH) < V ar(Ψ)|i>0 (7)
As pointed out in the literature7, V ar(Ψ) can be interpreted as a measure of the
informativeness of the state of nature and the monitoring signal taken together on
the true level of effort. As noted by Holmstro¨m (1979, 79) for the case of continuous
distributions, here too Ψ measures how strongly one is inclined to infer from the
outcome and the monitoring signal, that actual effort was not the agreed one.
b) c) and d):
The incentive compatibility constraint (ICe) is equivalent to
pHu(wN ) + (1− pH)(P (i)u(wH) + (1− P (i))u(wL))
−pLu(wN )− (1− pL)((1− P (i))u(wH) + P (i)u(wL)) = v(eH)− v(eL) .
(8)
Using that for the chosen utility function it holds that u(w) = 2 1u′(w) and substituting
(2), (3) and (4) into the ICe, one gets
2
λ1
λ2
V ar(Ψ) = v(eH)− v(eL) = const. (9)
As V ar(Ψ) increases in i, λ1λ2 must decrease in i in order for the equality to hold (a
movement ”along” the incentive constraint). The implications for the incentives on
effort depend on how λ1 and λ2 individually change with i. Next consider
V ar(
1
u′(w)
) = E[(
1
u′(w)
− E( 1
u′(w)
))2] . (10)
E(
1
u′(w)
) =
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
E(Ψ) =
1
λ2
, (11)
7See e.g. Kim / Suh (1992) and Lambert (1985).
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as E(Ψ) = 0. Thus one gets that
V ar(
1
u′(w)
) = (
λ1
λ2
)2V ar(Ψ) . (12)
As λ1λ2 decreases in i and
λ1
λ2
V ar(Ψ) = const, it follows that V ar( 1u′(w)) must decrease
in i.
Further, one can use that w = ( 1u′(w))
2 holds for the chosen utility function and
substitute (2), (3) and (4) in order to calculate expected wealth E(w|eH). But
expected wealth is constant for a given level of effort (zero-profit constraint) and,
for the high effort level, it is equal toW−(1−pH)L. Thus, the zero-profit constraint
is equivalent to
E(w|eH) = E[( 1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
Ψ)2]
= (
1
λ2
)2 + (
λ1
λ2
)2V ar(Ψ)
= (
1
λ2
)2 + V ar(
1
u′(w)
) =W − (1− pH)L = const. (13)
From this equality it follows that 1λ2 must increase in i. Using (11) and the fact that
with the chosen function E[u(w)] = 2E( 1u′(w)), it follows that
1
λ2
= E[u(w)]2 . Thus, the
expected contractual utility increases in i and so does the efficiency of the contract
(d). Using this, the above equality is equivalent to V ar( 1u′(w)) = E[w|eH ]− (E[u(w)])
2
4 .
Denote by CE the certainty equivalent of the contract, so that E[u(w)] = u(CE).
Hence it holds that(
1
λ2
)2
=
(E[u(w)])2
4
=
(u(CE))2
4
=
(2
√
CE)2
4
= CE . (14)
Now it is obvious, that V ar( 1u′(w)) = E[w|eH ]−CE is the risk premium of the con-
tract - denote it by R(i), which measures how efficiently the risk is shared between
the insurer and the insured - the smaller it is, the less risky is the contract from the
viewpoint of the insured (c).
Even though the spread between the two possible net wealths in the loss state may
increase with precision i, the probability of getting the larger net wealth wH in-
creases in i, which makes the individual better off.
As to b) one can conclude that as 1λ2 increases and
λ1
λ2
decreases in i, it must follow
that the shadow price for implementing the higher effort level λ1 must decrease in
i, that is the contract provides better effort incentives.
The marginal effect of precision on expected contractual utility at the solution,
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denoted by h(i), is found by
∂
∂i
E[u(w)] =
∂L
∂i
=
∂P (i)
∂i
(1− pH)((u(wH)− u(wL))λ2
(
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1 +
1− pL
1− pH )−
dH − dL
u(wH)− u(wL)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
h(i)
(15)
where, in accordance to the Envelope theorem, ∂L∂i is the partial derivative of the
Lagrangian with respect to i. For i ∈ (0, 1), as wH > wL, its sign depends on the
sign of the term in brackets in the above expression. Considering that
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(
1 +
1− pL
1− pH
)
>
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(
1− 1− p
L
1− pH
1− P (i)
P (i)
)
=
1
u′(wH)
>
dH − dL
u(wH)− u(wL) , (16)
where the first inequality follows from a comparison with (2) and the second in-
equality is due to the concavity of the utility function8, it follows that h(i) > 0 for
all i ∈ (0, 1). Thus,
∂L
∂i
= 0 for i = 0, because of wH = wL ,
∂L
∂i
> 0 for i ∈ (0, 1) ,
∂L
∂i
= 0 for i = 1 because of
∂P (i)
∂i
|i=1 = 0 . (17)
Expected utility would be highest with maximum precision of information i = 1,
which result is the expected, when there is a costless additional signal, which is
informative of effort9.
In the particular case of u(w) = 2
√
w, the marginal effect of precision on ex-
pected contractual utility can be expressed by means of the Lagrange multipliers
and V ar(Ψ) (see A2 (i) of the appendix), so that one obtains
∂L
∂i
= h(i) =
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
λ1
λ1
λ2
. (18)
As is further shown in A2 (ii) of the appendix, this expression is also equivalent to
∂L
∂i
= u′
E(w|eH)−R(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CE
 · [−dR(i)
d i
] . (19)
Concerning the characteristics of the marginal expected utility, one can ascertain
8For a concave function u(w) with wH > wL it holds that u(wH)− u(wL) > u′(wH)(wH − wL)
and in addition dH − dL = wH − wL.
9For example see Holmstro¨m (1979, 74-91).
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(as is also shown in A2 (iii) of the appendix), that
∂2L
∂i2
|i=0 > 0 (20)
and
∂2L
∂i2
|i=1 < 0 . (21)
Thus, expected contractual utility is convex in i around i = 0 and there must be a
region of i, in which it is concave.10 Moreover, it is shown in A2 (iii) that around
i = 0 the marginal value of information is itself concave in i.
∂3L
∂i3
|i=0 < 0 . (22)
P ′′′(i) ≤ 0 is a sufficient condition for the marginal value of information to be
globally concave.
3.2 Endogenous precision ex ante and privacy costs
In case that individuals incur privacy costs when they reveal information and the
terms of the contract prescribe that the level of precision is to be determined ex
ante, the optimal contracts are found by
max
r,dH ,dL,i
pHu(wN ) + (1− pH) (P (i)u(wH) + (1− P (i))u(wL))
−v(eH)− (1− pH)g(i) (23)
s.t.
pHu(wN ) + (1− pH) [P (i)u(wH) + (1− P (i))u(wL)]− v(eH)− (1− pH)g(i) ≥
pLu(wN ) + (1− pL) [(1− P (i))u(wH) + P (i)u(wL)]− v(eL)− (1− pL)g(i)
r − (1− pH) (P (i)dH + (1− P (i))dL) ≥ 0
Compared to the previous subsection nothing changes with the first order conditions
with respect to dH , dL and r so that the expressions (2), (3) and (4) remain the
same.
However, the marginal effect of precision on expected utility now becomes
∂
∂i
[
E[u(w)]− (1− pH)g(i)] = ∂L
∂i
=
∂P (i)
∂i
(1− pH)((u(wH)− u(wL))λ2
(
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1 +
1− pL
1− pH )−
dH − dL
u(wH)− u(wL)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
hp(i)
−g′(i)((1− pH)− λ1(pH − pL))︸ ︷︷ ︸
k(i)
. (24)
10Kim / Suh (1992) also derive this conclusion in proposition 2 of their paper.
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For u(w) = 2
√
w and using (18), the above expression is equivalent to
∂L
∂i
=
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
λ1
λ1
λ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
hp(i)
−g′(i)((1− pH)− λ1(pH − pL))︸ ︷︷ ︸
k(i)
. (25)
Privacy costs affect the marginal effect of precision on expected utility in several
different ways.
First consider k(i). In A3 of the appendix it is shown that (1−pH)−λ1(pH−pL) > 0
and thus k(i) is negative for i > 0. This shows that restricting individuals to choose
between a non-monitoring contract and exogenously fixed precision of monitoring i¯
might result in ∂L∂i |¯i < 0 for sufficiently large g′(¯i), that is it might lead to individuals
preferring the non-monitoring contract.
A closer look at k(i) shows that, although it is negative on the whole, this term
includes two opposite effects. There is the direct negative effect on expected utility
−(1 − pH)g′(i), which stems from losing privacy in the loss-state, and which is the
stronger one. But there is also an indirect positive effect, which is due to improved
incentives on effort: λ1g′(i)(pH − pL). Because privacy costs occur only in the state
of loss, there is an additional incentive for individuals to avoid it. This positive
effect of privacy costs reinforces the effect of a more efficient effort (larger difference
between pH and pL).
Another way to interpret the positive effect of privacy costs on incentives is to look
at the incentive constraint, which is equivalent to
pHu(wN ) + (1− pH)(P (i)u(wH) + (1− P (i))u(wL))
−pLu(wN )− (1− pL)((1− P (i))u(wH) + P (i)u(wL))
= v(eH)− v(eL)− (pH − pL)g(i) . (26)
Thus, privacy costs effectively decrease the difference between the disutilities of effort
and thereby make the implementation of the high effort level eH compared to the
low effort level eL more attractive. For u(w) = 2
√
w the incentive constraint is also
equivalent to
2
λ1
λ2
V ar(Ψ) = v(eH)− v(eL)− (pH − pL)g(i) . (27)
When i increases, the right hand side of the above equation decreases. A comparison
with the ICe in the benchmark situation (9) shows that now λ1λ2 has to decrease in
i even more. In consequence, the effect of an increase of precision i on risk sharing,
i.e. on V ar( 1u′(w)), will be stronger than in the benchmark situation. From the
zero-profit constraint in turn, it follows that with privacy costs 1λ2 , and thus the
expected contractual utility, increases, and λ1, i.e. the shadow price of incentives,
decreases more strongly in i than in the benchmark situation.
To restate this result, denote all variables for the case of privacy costs by the index
p. Then one obtains that for any given level of precision it will hold that λ1λ2 >
λp1
λp2
by virtue of the incentive constraints and, by combining this with the zero-profit
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constraints, it follows that the risk premium with privacy costs will be smaller than
without, R(i) > Rp(i). Hence, it follows directly, that for the same level of monitor-
ing precision, the expected utility from net wealth will be larger if there are privacy
costs, E[u(w)] = 2 1λ2 < 2
1
λp2
= E[u(wp)]. That is, privacy costs strengthen the effect
of monitoring precision on incentives, risk-sharing and contractual utility.
Although there is some positive effect of privacy costs, with the results that λp1 and λ
p
2
are smaller for any given level of precision as compared to the benchmark situation,
it also follows that hp(i) < h(i) (in (25) and (18)). Thus, all in all, with privacy costs
the marginal effect of precision on total expected utility will be smaller for every level
of precision i, ∂Lp∂i <
∂L
∂i . This also implies that
∫ i¯
0
∂Lp
∂i di|with g(·) <
∫ i¯
0
∂L
∂i di|ref.sit for
all i¯ ∈ (0, 1], which is equivalent to E[U(wp, eH , i)] < E[U(w, eH , i)]. That is, the
existence of privacy costs will decrease welfare as compared to the benchmark situ-
ation without privacy costs.
Nevertheless, if an interior solution for the level of precision exists, individuals will
prefer some monitoring. As was shown in the benchmark situation, the marginal
value of precision, if there are no privacy costs, is concave in i around i = 0 and
globally concave if P ′′′(i) ≤ 0. The marginal privacy cost function is increasing and
therefore, in order for an interior solution for i to exist in this scenario, it must hold
that
d2 L
d i2
|i=0 > 0 , (28)
which, by using the results of A2 (iii) of the appendix, is equivalent to
λ21
λ2
· ∂2V ar(Ψ)
∂P 2
· (∂P∂i )2
1− pH − λ1(pH − pL) > g
′′(0) , (29)
where all variables in the above expression are evaluated at i = 0. This condition
also ensures that i = 0 will not be optimal. Maximum precision, i.e. i = 1, will
never be optimal, as hp(1) = 0 in (24) and thus, ∂L∂i |i=1 < 0. Moreover, if P ′′′(i) ≤ 0,
the interior solution for i found by the first-order condition will be unique.
The above results are summarized as follows:
Proposition 1: With monitoring conditional on the loss and privacy costs (i)
individuals will choose some level of precision i ∈ (0, 1), if g′′(0) is not too large.
(ii) Privacy costs reinforce the incentives on effort λp1 < λ1 and (iii) improve the
efficiency of allocating the risk between the insured and the insurer, λp2 < λ2. (iv)
Thereby a higher expected utility from net wealth results, E[u(wp)] > E[u(w)]. (v)
However, on the whole the existence of privacy costs reduces the expected total
utility, E[U(wp, eH , i)] < E[U(w, eH , i)].
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3.3 Endogenous precision ex post
In this scenario the insurer and the insured do not agree on the level of precision
ex ante when the contract is signed. Instead, the individual is allowed to decide on
the precision of the information at the time he submits the black box to the insurer.
With improved monitoring technologies in the future this could be the natural con-
tinuation of the option that insureds currently have, to decide whether or not to
reveal information only after it is collected. Although at first sight this scenario
might seem beneficial from the viewpoint of the insured, in order for the contract
to work, it is necessary to include an incentive constraint with respect to the level
of precision i, which imposes a further restriction on the contract. In a first stage
the insurer sets the contract dH , dL, r. In a second stage the individual chooses the
precision of information for a given contract.
Stage 2: In case that a loss occurred, the individual chooses i to maximizeE[u(w)|Loss]−
g(i) for given dH , dL, r. The first order condition is:
∂P (i)
∂i
[u(wH)− u(wL)]− g′(i) = 0 for i > 0
≤ 0 for i = 0 . (30)
Given that wH > wL, there will be an interior solution for i at stage 2. Only if
wH ≤ wL, will the individual choose i = 0 at this stage.
In the first stage the insurer sets the contract according to his expectation about
the precision the individual will choose. If the insurer expects the insured to prefer
a non-monitoring contract i = 0, the maximization problem is the standard non-
monitoring one and it results in wH = wL. For i = 0 the insurer will never set
wH < wL, so that this case need not be regarded. Hence, for i ≥ 0, wH ≥ wL and
the optimal contract can be found by adding the above first order condition as an
incentive constraint with respect to i (first-order approach11) to the optimization
problem12:
Stage 1:
max
r,dH ,dL,i
pHu(wN ) + (1− pH)(P (i)u(wH) + (1− P (i))u(wL))
−v(eH)− (1− pH)g(i) (31)
s.t.
pHu(wN ) + (1− pH)(P (i)u(wH) + (1− P (i))u(wL))− v(eH)− (1− pH)g(i) ≥
pLu(wN ) + (1− pL)((1− P (i))u(wH) + P (i)u(wL))− v(eL)− (1− pL)g(i)
r − (1− pH)(P (i)dH + (1− P (i))dL) ≥ 0
∂P (i)
∂i
[u(wH)− u(wL)]− g′(i) = 0
11See e.g. Rogerson (1985) for a justification of this approach in the single-signal case and Jewitt
(1988) and Sinclair-Desgagne´ (1994) for multi-signal cases.
12As wH < wL will never result, it is not necessary to include an additional constraint requiring
that wH ≥ wL.
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Let λ3 be the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive constraint with respect to i
(ICi). In A4 of the appendix it is shown that λ1, λ2 > 0 for all i and λ3 ≥ 0 for
i > 0. From the first order conditions with respect to dH , dL and r the following
expressions result13:
1
u′(wH)
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1− 1− p
L
1− pH
1− P (i)
P (i)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΨH
+
λ3
λ2
∂P (i)
∂i
P (i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΩH
(32)
1
u′(wL)
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1− 1− p
L
1− pH
P (i)
1− P (i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΨL
+
λ3
λ2
−∂P (i)∂i
1− P (i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΩL
(33)
1
u′(wN )
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1− p
L
pH
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΨN
+
λ3
λ2
0︸︷︷︸
ΩN
(34)
As in the previous section, Ψ serves to infer the level of effort from the particular
outcome and monitoring signal taken together. Ω, on its part, is an indicator of the
chosen precision. The larger ∂P (i)∂i is (which in fact implies a higher efficiency of the
monitoring technology), the stronger are the incentives on precision14, but it also
implies a larger spread between wH and wL, which deteriorates risk sharing.
The first order condition with respect to i is
∂L
∂i
= (1− pH)∂P (i)
∂i
[u(wH)− u(wL)]− (1− pH)g′(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+λ1((1− pH)∂P (i)
∂i
[u(wH)− u(wL)]− (1− pH)g′(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+(1− pL)∂P (i)
∂i
[u(wH)− u(wL)] + (1− pL)g′(i))
−λ2(1− pH)∂P (i)
∂i
(dH − dL)
+λ3
(
∂2P (i)
∂i2
[u(wH)− u(wL)]− g′′(i)
)
≤ 0, i ≥ 0, ∂L
∂i
i = 0 . (35)
Bearing in mind that ∂P (i)∂i [u(wH) − u(wL)] − g′(i) = 0 must hold in the optimum,
the expression (1 − pL)∂P (i)∂i [u(wH) − u(wL)] + (1 − pL)g′(i) can be replaced with
13As in the benchmark situation it is assumed that an interior solution with wL > a exists.
14See also Holmstro¨m (1979, 79).
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2(1− pL)∂P (i)∂i [u(wH)− u(wL)], so that the first order condition reduces to
∂L
∂i
=
∂P (i)
∂i
[u(wH)− u(wL)](1− pH)λ2
(
2
λ1
λ2
1− pL
1− pH −
dH − dL
u(wH)− u(wL)
)
+λ3
(
∂2P (i)
∂i2
[u(wH)− u(wL)]− g′′(i)
)
≤ 0, i ≥ 0, ∂L
∂i
i = 0 . (36)
For i > 0 and λ3 > 0 the second term is negative - these are the additional costs from
not being able to set i ex ante, because by choosing dH , dL, r the principal has to
create incentives not only with respect to effort, but also with respect to the precision
of information.15 Although at the time of revealing the data, the agent also reveals
the level of precision, effectively the situation with this contract scheme is as if the
principal could not observe the level of precision. The reason for this result is that
at the time the contract is signed, the principal has to commit to a certain contract
(r, dH , dL), which cannot be renegotiated afterwards. However, at this point in time
the agent does not commit to a certain level of precision. Therefore, the principal
has to anticipate the level of precision and set the contract in a way that takes into
account the agent’s interest once after he has signed the contract.
In order to get an idea of the effects of precision on the expected utility in this
scenario, the same considerations as in the previous sections can be applied for
u(w) = 2
√
w. In A5 of the appendix it is shown that for small values of i the risk
premium will decrease in i. Therefore a marginal increase of precision, if precision is
low, will increase the expected contractual utility. However, for high values of i, the
risk premium will increase in i. That is, with a further increase of the level preci-
sion, the expected contractual utility will decrease. This result makes the difference
compared to the second scenario: when i is agreed upon ex ante, the expected con-
tractual utility E[u(w)] increases in i for all values of i. When the insured chooses i
ex post, the marginal effect of precision on the expected contractual utility is similar
as in the second scenario only for small values of i. The positive effect of improved
effort incentives on expected contractual utility prevails. However, due to the addi-
tional information asymmetry (concerning the precision of monitoring), the contract
imposes an additional risk on the individual. For large values of i the unfavorable
effect of this additional risk outweighs the beneficial incentive effect on effort so that
the marginal effect of precision on expected contractual utility becomes negative.
On the whole the effect of this additional information asymmetry on welfare, which
results in equilibrium with ex post precision, as compared to the equilibrium welfare
with precision ex ante, will be negative. In the following proposition this is shown
explicitly for u(w) = 2
√
w.
Proposition 2: Determining ex post the level of i deteriorates risk sharing and
reduces the efficiency of the contract.
Proof: see A7 of the appendix.
15The optimal level of precision is determined by (30) whereas the value of λ3 is obtained from
(36).
17
4 Signal based premiums and indemnities
As was mentioned in the introduction, some insurers offer contracts with monitoring
taking place in all states of nature. The collected data are analyzed in the end of
a billing period no matter if an accident has occurred or not. According to the
driving performance inferred from the records, the premium for the next period is
determined. In order to reflect this way of designing the contract in a one-period
model, it is assumed that individuals pay the insurance premium for the current
period not until the data are transferred to the insurer, i.e. the contract is a binding
promise for the insured to pay the premium in the end of the period. Although this
assumption concerning the premiums might seem critically unrealistic, a repetition
of the same period would yield each time the same results, so that in that case the
premiums could be regarded as applying to the next period. This contract scheme
is the most straightforward one as it imposes no restrictions on monitoring. In other
words, this contract makes unrestricted use of both the outcome and monitoring
as signals of the exerted effort and both the premiums and the indemnities can be
made dependent on the monitoring signal. The time structure is depicted in Fig.2.
The analysis is analogous as for the first contract scheme, so that only the main
results will be sketched briefly.
lossLoss/Noe i
LLL
LL
HHH
HH
sdr
sr
sdr
sr
L/if
/NoLif
L/if
/NoLif
+−
−
+−
−
Figure 2: time structure - basing premiums and indemnities on the signal
To implement the high effort level, the maximization problem with this contract
scheme, and with exogenous precision and no privacy costs, is
max
rH ,rL,dH ,dL
pH [P (i)u(wNH) + (1− P (i))u(wNL)] + (1− pH)[P (i)u(wAH)
+ (1− P (i))u(wAL)]− v(eH) (37)
s.t.
pH [P (i)u(wNH) + (1− P (i))u(wNL)] + (1− pH)[P (i)u(wAH)+
(1− P (i))u(wAL)]− v(eH) ≥ pL[(1− P (i))u(wNH) + P (i)u(wNL)]
+(1− pH)[(1− P (i))u(wAH) + P (i)u(wAL)]− v(eL)
P (i)rH + (1− P (i))rH − (1− pH)[P (i)dH + (1− P (i))dL] ≥ 0 ,
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where wNH = W − rH , wNL = W − rL, wAH = W − L − rH + dH , wAL =
W − L − rL + dL. After some transformation and for interior solutions, the first
order conditions with respect to dH , dL, rH and rL are equivalent to
1
u′(wAH)
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1− 1− p
L
1− pH
1− P (i)
P (i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΘAH
) (38)
1
u′(wAL)
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1− 1− p
L
1− pH
P (i)
1− P (i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΘAL
) (39)
1
u′(wNH)
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1− p
L
pH
1− P (i)
P (i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΘNH
) (40)
1
u′(wNL)
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1− p
L
pH
P (i)
1− P (i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΘNL
) . (41)
A comparison of the above expressions shows that (i) wNH > wNL > wAH > wAL,
if p
H(1−pL)
pL(1−pH) >
P 2
(1−P )2 , and (ii) wNH > wAH > wNL > wAL, if
pH(1−pL)
pL(1−pH) <
P 2
(1−P )2 .
In the first case, as efficiency of effort is relatively high and the efficiency of the
monitoring technology relatively low, the net wealth in the loss state will be smaller
than that in the no-loss state irrespectively of the signal. Partial damage insurance
is still the more effective way of setting incentives on effort. In the second case, as
the efficiency of monitoring is relatively high and the efficiency of effort relatively
low, the loss net wealth with the good signal (wAH) is larger than the no-loss net
wealth with the bad signal (wNL), i.e. monitoring conveys more information on
the chosen effort than the occurrence of the loss does and accordingly it has a
stronger influence on the payment. Moreover, the above condition for the efficiency
of precision is less restrictive than in the first contract scheme as P
2
(1−P )2 >
P
1−P , i.e.,
because monitoring takes place regardless of the occurrence of a loss, the technology
need not be as precise as in the first contract scheme in order for the payments to rely
relatively more heavily on the monitoring signal as compared to the occurrence of the
loss. Note, however, that in contrast to the first contract scheme, with which it was
possible to have dH > L, here both dL and dH are always below the value of the loss
dH < L. One can also ascertain, that for P (i)→ 1 (when the efficiency of monitoring
is very high), the contract will approach full damage insurance, wAH → wNH .16
16In fact it can be shown that conditional monitoring will also approach full damage insurance
if the precision of monitoring approaches perfect one. Even though with conditional monitoring
dH > L for high values of P (i), it is still true that dH → L for P (i)→ 1. One can easily verify by
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The marginal effect of precision on expected utility, transformed as a function of net
wealth, is
∂L
∂i
=
∂P (i)
∂i
(1− pH)((u(wAH)− u(wAL))λ2·
·
(
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1 +
1− pL
1− pH )−
wAH − wAL
u(wAH)− u(wAL)
)
+
∂P (i)
∂i
(1− pH)((u(wNH)− u(wNL))λ2·
·
(
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
(1 +
1− pL
1− pH )−
wNH − wNL
u(wNH)− u(wNL)
)
. (42)
and by the same arguments as before, it can be shown that ∂L∂i > 0 for i ∈ (0, 1).
For u(w) = 2
√
w the following expressions and equations are obtained, which will
be used for the comparison of the different contract schemes:
∂L
∂i
=
(
λ21
λ2
)
∂V ar(Θ)
∂i
, (43)
2
λ1
λ2
V ar(Θ) = v(eH)− v(eL) , (44)
V ar(
1
u′(w)
) = (
λ1
λ2
)2V ar(Θ) , (45)
and
E(w|eH) = ( 1
λ2
)2 + V ar(
1
u′(w)
) =W − (1− pH)L , (46)
where
V ar(Θ)|i>0 =
(
(pL)2
pH
+
(1− pL)2
1− pH
)(
[1− P (i)]2
P (i)
+
[P (i)]2
1− P (i)
)
− 1 , (47)
V ar(Θ)|i=0 = [p
H − pL]2
pH(1− pH) = V ar(Ψ)|i=0 , (48)
and
∂V ar(Θ)
∂i
=
∂V ar(Θ)
∂P (i)
∂P (i)
∂i
=
(2P − 1)
(P − 1)2P 2
(
(pL)2
pH
+
(1− pL)2
1− pH
)
∂P (i)
∂i
> 0 . (49)
Now consider the case of determining precision ex ante in the presence of privacy
costs. With this contract scheme privacy costs arise with certainty in the end of
considering that λ1 → 0 as P (i)→ 1.
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the period. As a result, the maximization problem (37) changes only in that g(i)
is subtracted from the objective function. The incentive constraint is unchanged as
g(i) is subtracted from both sides of it. The first order conditions with respect to
rH , rL, dH and dL are also unchanged. The first order condition with respect to
precision becomes for i > 0
∂L
∂i
=
(
λ21
λ2
)
∂V ar(Θ)
∂i
− g′(i) = 0 . (50)
Compared to the first contract scheme, the negative effect of privacy costs on ex-
pected utility as a result of a marginal increase of precision is larger. On the one
hand, because privacy is lost in both states of nature, the direct negative effect from
losing privacy is larger than in the first contract scheme. On the other hand, there
is no positive incentive effect on effort.
5 Comparison of the contract schemes
Note that the alternative contract schemes have a different number of states of
nature so that a comparison of the resulting welfare using a general utility function
would be difficult, if not impossible. By using the particular function u(w) = 2
√
w,
the optimality conditions for each contract scheme can be represented as functions
of the Lagrange multipliers and the level of precision, i.e. of the same number of
variables. This permits some ordering of the resulting values and drawing some
conclusions about the resulting welfare. Let the letter I stand for the first contract
scheme with conditional monitoring (where only the indemnities are based on the
signal), and B stand for the second contract scheme with unrestricted monitoring
(where both the premiums and the indemnities depend on the signal). From the
analysis of the benchmark situation, which was performed for each contract scheme,
it is obvious that a comparison of the resulting welfare for a given level of precision
i boils down to comparing the values of
V ar(Ψ) =
(pL)2
pH
+
(1− pL)2
1− pH
(
[1− P (i)]2
P (i)
+
[P (i)]2
1− P (i)
)
− 1 (51)
and
V ar(Θ) =
(
(pL)2
pH
+
(1− pL)2
1− pH
)(
[1− P (i)]2
P (i)
+
[P (i)]2
1− P (i)
)
− 1 . (52)
The larger the variance with a given level of precision is, the higher is the expected
contractual utility and consequently the welfare with the respective contract scheme.
For i = 0, V ar(Ψ) = V ar(Θ) = (p
H−pL)2
pH(1−pH) .
As was shown in the corresponding sections, both variances increase in precision, but
a direct comparison of the above expressions (and bearing in mind that [1−P (i)]
2
P (i) +
[P (i)]2
1−P (i) ≥ 1 increases in i) shows that V ar(Θ) > V ar(Ψ) for any level of i. The dif-
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ference between those two variances V ar(Θ) − V ar(Ψ) = (pL)2
pH
(
[1−P (i)]2
P (i) +
[P (i)]2
1−P (i)
)
grows with the precision of the monitoring technology and decreases with the ef-
ficiency of effort (as effort becomes more efficient, the term (p
L)2
pH
decreases). This
result is not surprising, as it exemplifies the well known principle, that both monitor-
ing and outcome should be used to design the contract, if they are both informative
of effort and if they are costless (see Holmstro¨m, 1979). When the precision of mon-
itoring increases, the monitoring signal becomes relatively more important for the
contract in its being informative of effort, and thus the advantages of the contract
scheme B, in which monitoring takes place in all states of nature, are reinforced as
compared to the first contract scheme I, in which monitoring is performed only in
the loss state. And the other way round, when the efficiency of effort increases, the
outcome as a signal of effort gains importance and the advantages of unrestricted
monitoring (B) over conditional monitoring (I) are weakened.
As was noted in the previous sections, including privacy costs will affect the opti-
mal level of precision and, in case of conditional monitoring, also the incentives on
effort. As was argued above, V ar(Θ) > V ar(Ψ), ∀ i ∈ (0, 1], i.e., the incentive and
risk sharing effects of monitoring precision itself are stronger in the case of B. How-
ever, this contract scheme B lacks the additional incentive and risk sharing effects of
privacy costs, which are characteristic of the first contract scheme I, and moreover,
for the same level of precision, the expected privacy costs in the second contract
scheme B are larger than in the first one I.
Denote by i∗B the optimal level of precision for the second contract scheme B. The
resulting total expected utility, net of the disutility of effort, is thereby E[u(wB)]−
g(i∗B). Denote by E[u(wI)]|i=i∗B − (1 − pH)g(i∗B) the total expected utility which is
attained by the first contract scheme I at the same level of precision i∗B. In A8 of
the appendix it is shown that
Proposition 3: E[u(wI)]|i=i∗B − (1 − pH)g(i∗B) > E[u(wB)] − g(i∗B), which is a
sufficient condition for the equilibrium welfare with conditional monitoring (I) to
be larger than the equilibrium welfare with unrestricted monitoring (B), if
2
√
CEI |i∗B − 2
√
CEB|i∗B + pH · g(i∗B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
> 0 , (53)
where
CEI |i∗B = E(w|eH)−
[∆v − (pH − pL)g(i∗B)]2
4V ar(Ψ)|i∗B
, (54)
CEB|i∗B = E(w|eH)−
(∆v)2
4V ar(Θ)|i∗B
, (55)
and ∆v = v(eH)− v(eL).
The above condition is more likely to be satisfied, the larger the privacy costs at
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the equilibrium level of precision i∗B, the smaller the probability of loss, the higher
the efficiency of effort, the lower the efficiency of precision and the smaller the dif-
ference between the disutilities of effort are. A larger value of privacy costs g(i∗B)
implies that the advantage of conditional monitoring, by incurring those costs only
in the case of loss (1− pH)g(i∗B), is reinforced (direct effect of privacy costs). More-
over, thereby the incentive and risk-sharing effects of privacy costs on the contract
with conditional monitoring I become stronger (indirect effects of privacy costs). A
smaller probability of loss essentially works in the same direction. A higher efficiency
of effort (pH − pL) reinforces the incentive effect of privacy costs with conditional
monitoring I, and also weakens the advantage of a larger value for V ar(Θ) as com-
pared to V ar(Ψ). A lower efficiency of precision, i.e. a smaller value of P (i) for a
given i, also weakens the advantage of V ar(Θ) being larger than V ar(Ψ) and in-
directly increases the costs of implementing a given level of precision, which again
speaks for conditional monitoring I. With a smaller value of ∆v, which reduces the
costs of implementing the high effort level, also a lower level of precision is sufficient
to induce the same incentive and risk sharing effects. This in turn reinforces the
relative effect of privacy costs on incentives and risk sharing in the contract scheme
with conditional monitoring I.
As was mentioned already, with conditional monitoring I, privacy costs generate an
incentive, a risk-sharing and a direct effect on welfare. If the same level of preci-
sion generates better incentives with I as compared to B, also risk sharing will be
better and hence the expected contractual utility will be larger. By incurring lower
expected privacy costs as compared to B, also the total expected utility with I will
be larger. But even if incentives and risk sharing are worse(and thus expected con-
tractual utility is smaller) with I, due to the smaller expected privacy costs, total
expected utility might still be larger.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper considers the problem of moral hazard in perfectly competitive insurance
markets when voluntary monitoring technologies are available and the insureds may
choose the comprehensiveness of monitoring data and thereby the level of precision.
Also privacy costs incurred to individuals when revealing information are taken into
account. Two alternative insurance contract schemes are compared in terms of wel-
fare. The first scheme prescribes monitoring conditional on the loss and that only
the insurance indemnities depend on the monitoring signal. The second contract
scheme provides unrestricted monitoring and thus completely involves both the out-
come and the monitoring signal into the sharing rule. Both the indemnities and the
premiums are allowed to depend on the monitoring signal.
If there are no privacy costs, maximum amount of data will be optimal for any con-
tract scheme. For the same level of precision, the second contract scheme attains a
higher welfare as it unrestrictedly uses the informativeness of both the outcome and
monitoring.
With privacy costs some positive level of monitoring will be optimal for any con-
tract scheme, unless the privacy costs increase too fast in relation to the precision of
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monitoring. In the presence of privacy costs, the contract scheme with conditional
monitoring has some advantages over unrestricted monitoring. On the one hand,
the expected privacy costs are smaller because they are incurred only in the state
of loss. On the other hand, privacy costs generate an additional incentive effect on
effort and a positive effect on the allocation of risk. When the monitoring costs
occur only in the state of loss, individuals have an additional incentive to take care
in order to avoid them. The risk borne by the insured is reduced because, for a given
level of monitoring precision, when there are privacy costs, a smaller proportion of
the risk needs to be transferred to the individual in order to provide him with the
same incentives on effort compared to when there are no privacy costs. Because the
second contract scheme lacks these positive effects of privacy costs, there will be
conditions under which, despite of its better use of information, it will be welfare
dominated by the contract scheme with conditional monitoring. In particular, this
result is likely to occur if: the efficiency of effort is high, the probability of loss is
small, the efficiency of the monitoring technology is low, and the optimal privacy
costs resulting with unrestricted monitoring are large.
Even though there is no evidence yet concerning the dimensions of the costs, which
are incurred when individuals lose their privacy of driving behavior, there are some
reasons to believe that the remaining prerequisites for conditional monitoring to be
welfare optimal apply in practice. As noted by Lemaire (1998), the probabilities
of loss can be approximated by the claim frequency, which average for Belgium is
about 10%. This value is probably small enough to speak in favor of conditional
monitoring. There is also some evidence that moral hazard, which is a manifestation
of a positive efficiency of effort, is truly an issue in automobile insurance markets.
For the French automobile insurance market, Dionne / Michaud / Dahchour (2004)
find that, as a result of the stronger incentives created by switching from all-risk
to third-party coverage, insureds’ probability for filing a claim in a year decreases
by 5.9 percentage point. There are also further findings that indicate an existent
efficiency of effort in automobile insurance. Dionne / Maurice / Pinquet / Vanasse
(2005) also find that driver’s risk significantly depends on care. The question of
how well the data, measured by the contemporary monitoring systems, are suited
to approximate the true risk of the individual, is yet to be examined. Undoubt-
edly, monitoring technologies will continually improve in the future but, at least
currently they are probably far from being perfect. These arguments imply that,
in the presence of privacy costs, monitoring conditional on the loss is likely to be
welfare maximizing. Finally, even though bonus-malus systems, which are applied
in many countries to cope with information asymmetries, cannot cause a loss of
privacy, it should be taken into account that, depending on the particular design of
the bonus-malus system, for good risks to reach their steady state it can take up to
thirty years (see Lemaire (1998)).
A further implication of the results in this paper is that, for a given level of monitor-
ing precision, a contract scheme which imposes conditional monitoring will attain
a higher expected utility from welfare if individuals incur privacy costs as opposed
to a situation in which individuals do not care about the loss of privacy. However,
the overall welfare of individuals will still be lower in the presence of privacy costs.
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Because the privacy cost functions in different types of insurance markets might
differ and are generally unknown, inferring the efficiency of the respective contracts
only on the basis of observable risk sharing might be misleading. Even if a contract
offers more coverage and therefore better risk sharing, it need not imply that the
precision of monitoring and welfare with this contract is higher. On the one hand,
better risk sharing in a market can be equally well explained by a lower precision of
monitoring, however accompanied by faster increasing privacy costs. On the other
hand, even if the precision of monitoring is the same in both types of insurance
markets, in the case of faster increasing privacy costs, risk sharing will indeed be
better but the overall welfare of the individual will still be smaller.
Another result in this paper is that letting the individuals choose the precision of the
monitoring technology at the time they reveal the data is inefficient. More generally,
this result also suggests that, contracts which allow individuals to choose whether
or not to reveal information only after they collect and review the data, cannot be
expected to persist in the long term.
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Appendix
A1: λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0.
By combining the first order conditions ∂L
∂dH
= 0, ∂L
∂dL
= 0 and ∂L∂r = 0, r > 0, one
obtains
pHλ2 = pHu′(W − r) + λ1(pH − pL)u′(W − r) . (56)
The right hand-side of this equality is positive and so must the left hand-side. Hence,
λ2 > 0. Assume that λ1 = 0. From the first order conditions it follows that
wH = wL = wN , which is not incentive compatible. Therefore λ1 > 0.
A2:
(i) Using (2), (3) and (4) one obtains
dH − dL
u(wH)− u(wL) =
wH − wL
u(wH)− u(wL) =
(
1
u′(wH)
)2 − ( 1u′(wL))2
2
(
1
u′(wH)
− 1u′(wL)
)
=
1
2
(
1
u′(wH)
+
1
u′(wL)
)
=
1
λ2
+
λ1
λ2
− 1
2
λ1
λ2
1− pL
1− pH
[1− P (i)]2 + [P (i)]2
P (i)[1− P (i)] (57)
and
u(wH)− u(wL) = 2λ1
λ2
1− pL
1− pH
(
P (i)
1− P (i) −
1− P (i)
P (i)
)
(58)
which can be substituted into h(i). After some transformation the marginal effect
of precision is equivalent to
∂L
∂i
=
∂P (i)
∂i
λ1
2P (i)− 1
P (i)[1− P (i)]
λ1
λ2
(1− pL)2
1− pH
1
P (i)[1− P (i)] (59)
Now using (6), one obtains for the marginal effect of precision on expected utility
∂L
∂i
= h(i) =
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
λ1
λ1
λ2
(60)
(ii) Having that R(i) =
(
λ1
λ1
)2
V ar(Ψ), it follows that
dR(i)
d i
= 2
λ1
λ2
d
d i
(
λ1
λ2
)
V ar(Ψ) +
(
λ1
λ2
)2 ∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
(61)
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Taking the total differential of ICe (9), one obtains
2
d
di
(
λ1
λ2
)
V ar(Ψ) + 2
λ1
λ2
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
= 0 (62)
Thus,
d
di
(
λ1
λ2
)
V ar(Ψ) = −λ1
λ2
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
(63)
This can be substituted into dR(i)d i , which becomes
dR(i)
d i
= 2
λ1
λ2
(
−λ1
λ2
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
)
+
(
λ1
λ2
)2 ∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
= −
(
λ1
λ2
)2 ∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
(64)
Now for the marginal value of information one obtains that
∂L
∂i
=
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
λ1
λ1
λ2
=
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
(
λ1
λ2
)2
λ2 = −dR(i)
d i
λ2 (65)
As was shown in the main text,
(
1
λ2
)2
= CE. Hence, λ2 = 1√CE . But then,
considering that
u′(CE) =
(
2
√
CE
)′
=
1√
CE
= λ2 , (66)
it follows, that
∂L
∂i
= u′(CE)
(
−dR(i)
d i
)
. (67)
(iii) Consider again the former expression for the marginal value of information:
∂L
∂i
= h(i) =
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
λ1
λ1
λ2
. (68)
From it one obtains that
∂2L
∂i2
=
λ21
λ2
·
(
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂P
· ∂
2P
∂i2
+
∂2V ar(Ψ)
∂P 2
(
∂P
∂i
)2)
. (69)
Here it was used, that
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂i
=
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂P
· ∂P (i)
∂i
, (70)
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and hence, for the second derivative of V ar(Ψ), also that
∂2 V ar(Ψ)
∂i2
=
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂P
· ∂
2P
∂i2
+
∂2V ar(Ψ)
∂P 2
(
∂P
∂i
)2
. (71)
One can verify, that
∂2V ar(Ψ)
∂P 2
=
2(1− 3P + 3P 2)
(1− P )3P 3
(1− pL)2
1− pH , (72)
which is positive for all values of P (i) ∈ [12 , 1).
Now consider the sign of ∂
2L
∂i2
in (69) for i = 0. From (6), as P (0) = 12 , one can
ascertain that ∂V ar(Ψ)∂P |i=0 = 0. Thus,
∂2L
∂i2
|i=0 = λ
2
1
λ2
· ∂
2V ar(Ψ)
∂P 2
(
∂P
∂i
)2
> 0 . (73)
For i = 1 one obtains, due to ∂P∂i |i=1 = 0,
∂2L
∂i2
|i=1 = λ
2
1
λ2
· ∂V ar(Ψ)
∂P
· ∂
2P
∂i2
< 0 . (74)
For the third derivative of the value of information at i = 0 one obtains
∂3 L
∂i3
|i=0 = λ
2
1
λ2
(
∂3V ar(Ψ)
∂P 3
·
(
∂P
∂i
)3
+
∂2V ar(Ψ)
∂P 2
2
∂P
∂i
∂2P
∂i2
)
. (75)
For
∂3V ar(Ψ)
∂P 3
=
6(−1 + 4P − 6P 2 + 4P 3)
(1− P )4P 4
(1− pL)2
1− pH (76)
it can be verified, that it is negative ∀P (12 , 1] and is equal to zero for P (0) = 12 .
Hence, it follows that
∂3 L
∂i3
|i=0 < 0 . (77)
Thus, the marginal value of information is concave around i = 0 and there must
also be a region of i ∈ (0, 1] of local concavity for it. Moreover, for any value of i,
∂3 L
∂i3
=
λ21
λ2
·
(
∂2V ar(Ψ)
∂P 2
∂P
∂i
∂2P
∂i2
+
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂P
∂3P
∂i3
+
∂3V ar(Ψ)
∂P 3
·
(
∂P
∂i
)3
+
∂2V ar(Ψ)
∂P 2
2
∂P
∂i
∂2P
∂i2
)
.
(78)
∂3P
∂i3
≤ 0 is a sufficient condition for ∂3L
∂i3
< 0 ∀i, i.e. for the marginal value of infor-
mation to be globally concave. The value of information is convex in i around i = 0,
and there is a region of i, for which it is concave.
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A3: k(i) = −g′(i)((1− pH)− λ1(pH − pL)) < 0.
Proof: Solving (4) and (3) for λ2 and setting them equal, one obtains for λ1
λ1 =
[u′(wL)− u′(wN )]pH(1− pH)(1− P )
u′(wN )(pH − pL)(1− pH)(1− P )− pHu′(wL)[(1− pH)(1− P )− (1− pL)P ]
(79)
The numerator is positive due to u′(wL) > u′(wN ). Because λ1 > 0, also the
expression in the denominator - denote it by Γ - must be positive.
Assume that (1−pH)−λ1(pH−pL) < 0. After some transformation this is equivalent
to
u′(wL)pH(1− pH)(1− 2P )(1− pL)− u′(wN )(pH − pL)(1− pH)(1− P )
Γ
> 0
(80)
However, 1 − 2P < 0 because of P > 12 for i > 0. The first term in the above
nominator is thus negative, the second is also negative, which is a contradiction to
the above assumption. Thus (1− pH)− λ1(pH − pL) > 0 and k(i) < 0.
A4: λ1, λ2 > 0 for all i, λ3 = 0 for i = 0 and λ3 ≥ 0 for i > 0.
Proof: As in the benchmark situation, by combining ∂L
∂dH
= 0, ∂L
∂dL
= 0 and ∂L∂r = 0,
one obtains that λ2 > 0. For λ3 = 0, in order for the contract to be incentive
compatible, λ1 > 0 must hold. For λ3 > 0 assume that λ1 = 0. From the first order
condition with respect to i it follows that ∂L∂i < 0, i = 0. However, this solution is
not incentive compatible and hence λ1 > 0 must hold also in this case.
Assume that in the optimum i > 0 and λ3 = 0. In this case the results for wH ,
wL, wN , λ1 and λ2 in the third scenario (i cannot be determined ex ante) must
correspond exactly to the results of the second scenario (i is set ex ante). Looking
at the first order condition with respect to i (36) shows that it is satisfied for λ3 = 0
only if
2
λ1
λ2
1− pL
1− pH ≤
dH − dL
u(wH)− u(wL) . (81)
That is, λ3 = 0, only if the optimal values of the variables as found by solving the
problem in the second scenario (precision ex ante) satisfy the above equation. If the
opposite holds, then with λ3 = 0 and i > 0, ∂L∂i > 0 would result and hence, in that
case λ3 must be positive. In the following it will be shown that λ3 > 0 can be the
case for small values of P (i).
On the one hand, from the first order condition (2) it follows that for small values
of P
1
λ2
>
1
u′(wH)
. (82)
will hold. On the other hand, from (79) one obtains that for small values of P (i)→
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1
2+
lim
P→ 1
2+
λ1 =
[u′(wL)− u′(wN )]pH(1− pH)12
1
2u
′(wN )(pH − pL)(1− pH)− pHu′(wL)[(1− pH)12 − (1− pL)12 ]
=
[u′(wL)− u′(wN )]pH(1− pH)
(pH − pL)[(1− pH)u′(wN ) + pHu′(wL)] . (83)
It can be verified that λ1 will be larger than 1, if
[u′(wL)− u′(wN )][pH(1− pH)− (pH)2 + pHpL] ≥ (pH − pL)u′(wN ) (84)
holds. This will be the case, if risk aversion and herewith the difference [u′(wL) −
u′(wN )] is large enough or the efficiency of effort (pH − pL) is sufficiently low.
Hence, for small values of P (i), λ1 > 1 is a sufficient condition for
2
λ1
λ2
1− pL
1− pH > 2λ1
1− pL
1− pH
1
u′(wH)
>
dH − dL
u(wH)− u(wL) , (85)
where the first inequality follows directly from (82), and the second inequality fol-
lows from λ1 > 1, and 1u′(wH) >
dH−dL
u(wH)−u(wL) (due to the concavity of the utility
function). In this case λ3 > 0.
A5: Choosing precision ex post.
For u(w) = 2
√
w, it can be shown that now the incentive constraint with respect to
effort ICe is equivalent to
2
[
λ1
λ2
V ar(Ψ) +
λ3
λ2
E(Ψ · Ω)
]
= v(eH)− v(eL)− g(i)(pH − pL) , (86)
where V ar(Ψ) is calculated as before (with E(Ψ) = 0 and ∂V ar(Ψ)∂i > 0) and
∂P (i)
∂i
(1− pL)[2P (i)− 1]
[1− P (i)]P (i) = E(Ψ · Ω) . (87)
One can ascertain, that E(Ω) = 0 and thus E(Ψ ·Ω) = Cov(Ψ,Ω). For the effect of
precision on it consider
∂E(Ψ · Ω)
∂i
= (1− pL)
(
∂P (i)
∂i
)2
[
1
P (i)2
+
1
(1− P (i))2 ]
+
∂2P (i)
∂i2
(1− pL) 2P (i)− 1
(1− P (i))P (i) . (88)
The first term of the above expression is positive. The second term is negative due
to ∂
2P (i)
∂i2
< 0. However, if
∣∣∣∂2P (i)∂i2 ∣∣∣ is sufficiently small, then ∂E(Ψ·Ω)∂i > 0. If the
probability of observing sH does not increase too slowly in the amount of data i,
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then the covariance between the measure of the exerted effort and the measure of
the chosen precision will increase with the amount of data.
When i increases, the right hand-side of (86) decreases and so must the left hand
side (movement ”along” the ICe). λ3 is the shadow price of setting incentives for
the individual to reveal a certain level of precision i. When the level of precision i
grows, this multiplier will also become larger, as it is more costly to implement a
higher level of precision (see A6 of the appendix). The above equation (86) implies
that it is not possible for both λ1λ2 and
λ3
λ2
to increase as the level of precision becomes
larger. Using the previous result that the shadow price of incentives on effort λ1
decreases in i, the following can be inferred: if a larger level of precision causes 1λ2 to
increase, then λ3λ2 will also increase and
λ1
λ2
must decrease; if a larger level of precision
reduces 1λ2 , then
λ1
λ2
will also decline and λ3λ2 might either decrease or increase. In
any case λ1λ2 will decrease when the level of precision is increased.
Comparing (86), (27) and (9) for the same value of i, where V ar(Ψ) has the same
value in all three scenarios, it is obvious (as was noted in the previous section) that
λ1
λ2
has to be smaller in the second scenario compared to the benchmark situation.
As was mentioned before, this is because privacy costs improve incentives on effort.
Further, it follows that λ1λ2 is even smaller in this third scenario, in which precision
is specified ex post.
With u(w) = 2
√
w the incentive constraint with respect to i ICi is equivalent to
∂P (i)
∂i
[u(wH)− u(wL)] = g′(i)⇐⇒
2
[
λ1
λ2
∂P (i)
∂i
(1− pL)[2P (i)− 1]
[1− P (i)]P (i) +
λ3
λ2
[
∂P (i)
∂i
]2 1− pH
P (i)[1− P (i)]
]
= (1− pH)g′(i) (89)
It can be shown that[
∂P (i)
∂i
]2 (1− pH)
P (i)[1− P (i)] = V ar(Ω) . (90)
The partial derivative of V ar(Ω) with respect to i is equal to
∂V ar(Ω)
∂i
=
(1− pH)(P ′(i))3(2P (i)− 1)
(1− P (i))2P (i2) +
2(1− pH)P ′(i)P ′′(i)
(1− P (i))P (i) . (91)
The first term is positive, the second one is negative. But if
∣∣∣∂2P (i)∂i2 ∣∣∣ is sufficiently
small (which implies that the monitoring technology is efficient), then ∂V ar(Ω)∂i > 0,
i.e. the ability to infer from Ω the actual chosen level of precision, grows with the
level of precision. Hence ICi is equivalent to
2
[
λ1
λ2
E(Ψ · Ω) + λ3
λ2
V ar(Ω)
]
= (1− pH)g′(i) . (92)
Having g′′(i) > 0, the right hand side of the above equation increases in i and so
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must the left hand side (movement along the ICi).
As in the previous scenarios, these expressions for ICe (86) and ICi (92) can be
used in order to calculate the risk premium
V ar
[
1
u′(w)
|eH
]
= E
[[
1
u′(w)
− E
(
1
u′(w)
)]2]
.
As before E(1/u′(w)) = 1λ2 and hence for the risk premium one obtains,
V ar
[
1
u′(w)
|eH
]
= E
[[
λ1
λ2
Ψ+
λ3
λ2
Ω
]2]
=
(
λ1
λ2
)2
V ar(Ψ) + 2
λ1
λ2
λ3
λ2
E(Ψ · Ω) +
(
λ3
λ2
)2
V ar(Ω)
=
λ1
λ2
(
λ1
λ2
V ar(Ψ) +
λ3
λ2
E(Ψ · Ω)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ICe
+
λ3
λ2
(
λ1
λ2
E(Ψ · Ω) + λ3
λ2
V ar(Ω)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ICi
. (93)
From (86) it follows, that the term in the first brackets declines in i and so does λ1λ2 .
From (92) it follows that the term in the second brackets increases in i and λ3λ2 might
either increase or decrease. For small i, λ3 and the term in the second brackets (ICi)
will be small and the effect of the first term will prevail, i.e. for small i an increase
of the level of precision will decrease the risk premium V ar
[
1
u′(w) |eH
]
, i.e. it will
improve risk sharing. The reverse can be argued for large values of i. Then λ3 will
grow and as g′(i) grows large enough, the effect of a marginal increase of precision
on V ar
[
1
u′(w) |eH
]
will be positive, i.e. risk sharing will become less efficient. The
repercussions of these considerations on expected contractual utility E[u(w)] = 2 1λ2
are reversed and can be derived as before from the zero-profit constraint. It can be
verified that
E(w|eH) =
(
1
λ2
)2
+ V ar
[
1
u′(w)
|eH
]
=W − (1− pH)L (94)
applies also in this case. It follows that, for small values of i, as V ar
[
1
u′(w) |eH
]
decreases in i, a marginal increase of precision will increase expected contractual
utility. For high values of i, or when V ar
[
1
u′(w) |eH
]
increases in i, the expected
contractual utility will fall with a further increase of i.
A6: λ3 increases when precision i increases
Proof: Assume that i∗ and λ3 are the values of the variables in the optimum such
that all 4 equations (30) and (36), (92) and (86) are satisfied. Specifically it holds
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that
∂P (i)
∂i
|i∗ [u(wH)− u(wL)]− g′(i∗) = 0 . (95)
Now assume an exogenous reduction of g′′(i) for all i which leads to
∂P (i)
∂i
|i∗ [u(wH)− u(wL)]− g′(i∗) > 0 . (96)
For u(w) = 2
√
w one obtains from the expressions in (32) and (33) that
u(wH)− u(wL) = 2λ1
λ2
1− pL
1− pH
(
P (i)
1− P (i) −
1− P (i)
P (i)
)
+ 2
λ3
λ2
∂P (i)
∂i
P (i)(1− P (i)) . (97)
Observing the above expressions, it follows that, in order to restore the equality in
(96), and holding everything else constant, either i has to increase, or λ3 to decrease.
A7: Proof of Proposition 2
Let the index F stand for fixed, in the sense that i is fixed ex ante when the contract
is signed, and N the index for not fixed, in the sense that at the time the contract is
signed, no agreement concerning the level of precision is made (precision is chosen
ex post). For a given level of precision i, in which case the right hand sides of (27)
and (86) are equal, by combining those two equalities it follows that
λF1
λF2
V ar(Ψ) =
λN1
λN2
V ar(Ψ) +
λN3
λN2
E(Ψ · Ω) , (98)
from which
λN1
λN2
=
λF1
λF2
− λ
N
3
λN2
E(Ψ · Ω)
V ar(Ψ)
. (99)
When precision is determined ex ante, the risk premium is
V ar
(
1
u′(wF )
)
=
(
λF1
λF2
)2
V ar(Ψ) (100)
(see (12), which expression holds both for the benchmark situation and for the
second scenario).
When precision is determined ex post (93) V ar
(
1
u′(w)
)
rewritten again is
V ar
(
1
u′(wN )
)
=
(
λN1
λN2
)2
V ar(Ψ) + 2
λN1
λN2
λN3
λN2
E(Ψ · Ω) +
(
λN3
λN2
)2
V ar(Ω) .
(101)
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Substituting for λ
N
1
λN2
the expression from (99), the above equation reduces to
V ar
(
1
u′(wN )
)
=
(
λF1
λF2
)2
V ar(Ψ) +
(
λN3
λN2
)2
V ar(Ω) . (102)
Comparing (100) and (102) shows that
V ar
(
1
u′(wN )
)
> V ar
(
1
u′(wF )
)
, (103)
i.e. for any level of precision the risk premium with precision ex post is larger
than the risk premium with precision ex ante. It follows directly that E[u(wN )] <
E[u(wF )]. That is, for any arbitrary level of precision the expected contractual util-
ity is smaller when precision is chosen ex post. Therefore, for any arbitrary level of
precision, also the total expected utility is smaller when precision is chosen ex post
than when it is chosen ex ante, E[u(wN )]− (1− pH)g(i) < E[u(wF )]− (1− pH)g(i).
Although the optimal level of precision will generally be different in the two scenar-
ios, the above relation holds for any i ∈ (0, 1]. In other words, the total expected
utility in the third scenario (precision ex post) will be below the total expected
utility in the second scenario (precision ex ante) throughout the whole support of
i, from which it follows that welfare at the optimum level of precision for the third
scenario will be smaller than the welfare at the optimal level of precision for the
second scenario.
A8: Comparison of I and B in the presence of privacy costs:
(27), (12) and (13) for I and (44) to (46) for B can be transformed to obtain:
λB1
λB2
=
∆v
2V ar(Θ)
(104)
V ar
(
1
u′(wB)
)
=
(∆v)2
4V ar(Θ)
(105)
(
1
λB2
)2
= E[w|eH ]− (∆v)
2
4V ar(Θ)
(106)
and
λI1
λI2
=
∆v − (pH − pL)g(i)
2V ar(Ψ)
(107)
V ar
(
1
u′(wI)
)
=
(∆v − (pH − pL)g(i))2
4V ar(Ψ)
(108)
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(
1
λI2
)2
= E[w|eH ]− (∆v − (p
H − pL)g(i))2
4V ar(Ψ)
(109)
From the above expressions it follows that for a given level of precision i, λ
I
1
λI2
<
λB1
λB2
,
if
∆v − (pH − pL)g(i)
∆v
<
V ar(Ψ)
V ar(Θ)
(110)
In that case, risk-sharing is better, expected contractual utility and total expected
utility are larger with I than with B and incentives on effort with I are better than
with B (λI1 < λ
B
1 ).
But even if the reverse is true, λ
I
1
λI2
>
λB1
λB2
, it is still possible that risk-sharing with
I might be better than with B, V ar
(
1
u′(wI)
)
< V ar
(
1
u′(wB)
)
, which also implies
larger contractual utility with I (λI2 < λ
B
2 ):
(∆v − (pH − pL)g(i))2
(∆v)2
<
V ar(Ψ)
V ar(Θ)
. (111)
This in turn implies better incentives with I, λI1 < λ
B
1 . Note that
∆v−(pH−pL)g(i)
∆v is
less than 1, so that the above condition is less restrictive than the first one.
Finally, even if risk sharing with I is worse than with B, i.e. E[u(w∗I )] < E[u(w
∗
B)], it
is still possible, that total expected utility is larger with I due to the smaller privacy
costs, which are incurred with conditional monitoring. Note, that E[u(wI)] − (1 −
pH)g(i) > E[u(wB)]− g(i) for i = i∗B, which is the optimal level of precision for the
third contract scheme B, is a sufficient condition for the equilibrium level of total
expected utility with I to dominate the equilibrium level of total expected utility
with B. This in turn, using the fact that E[u(w)] = 2 1λ2 = 2
√
CE and the above
expressions, is equivalent to
2
√
CEI − 2
√
CEB + pH · g(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
> 0 , (112)
where
CEI = E(w|eH)− [∆v − (p
H − pL)g(i)]2
4V ar(Ψ)
(113)
and
CEB = E(w|eH)− (∆v)
2
4V ar(Θ)
(114)
Denote the left hand-side of the above inequality by F . It can be verified, that
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∂F
∂g(i) > 0,
∂F
∂pH
> 0, ∂F
∂pL
< 0 and ∂F∂∆v < 0. For the sign of the last derivative,
∂F
∂∆v
= −(∆v − (p
H − pL)g(i))
2V ar(Ψ)
1√
CEI
+
∆v
2V ar(Θ)
1√
CEB
(115)
it was taken into account, that the contractual utility with I being smaller than
the contractual utility with B for a given level of precision, E[u(wI)] < E[u(wB)],
which is equivalent to 1
λI2
< 1
λB2
, is only possible, if λ
I
1
λI2
>
λB1
λB2
. From the above
expressions for these terms, it follows that (∆v−(p
H−pL)g(i))
2V ar(Ψ) >
∆v
2V ar(Θ) . Further
E[u(wI)] < E[u(wB)] is equivalent to CEI < CEB and thus 1√CEI >
1√
CEB
, from
which the sign of the derivative is unambiguously negative.
For the sign of ∂F∂P (i∗B)
, one can verify that
∂F
∂P (i∗B)
=
∂V ar(Ψ)
∂P
(λI1)
2
λI2
− ∂V ar(Θ)
∂P
(λB1 )
2
λB2
(116)
If, at i = i∗B, incentives and risk-sharing are better with I than with B (λ
I
1 < λ
B
1 ,
λI2 < λ
B
2 ) and
λI1
λI2
<
λB1
λB2
, it was shown above that total expected utility with I will
be larger than with B, then F > 0. Due to ∂V ar(Ψ)∂i <
∂V ar(Θ)
∂i ,
∂F
∂P (i∗B)
< 0. In that
case, an improvement of the monitoring technology, i.e. larger P (i) for any value of
i, will reduce the advantage of I as compared to B. Note that I being better than
B is more likely if P (i∗B) is small, and generally, if the efficiency of the monitoring
technology is low.
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